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Abstract. In recent years increasing number of contractual arrangements in food chains are observed. There are 
several reasons for this phenomenon. Improving food quality often requires significant specific investments. Given 
high asset specificity, investors find it difficult to appropriate the returns on investment and thus have incentives to 
integrate. However, besides this transaction costs related argument, the ongoing vertical integration can result form 
structural developments in food chains which at different stages of the value chains, might hamper the proper 
functioning of markets. Using a unique, firm level dataset, in this paper we will focus on the latter issue. Due to its 
importance among various Hungarian value chains, we have selected the milk market. The objective is to conduct an 
analysis of market structure and pricing behaviour, with the main research question being the existence and 
significance of market power, its impact of factor allocation and the induced incentives for forward and backward 
integration. Several theoretical and empirical approaches including structural model estimation are applied in order to 
investigate whether market power is exploited or not. The empirical results are discussed against the background of 
several issues associated with the functioning of markets and a better understanding of institutional choice. Moreover, 
policy recommendation will be discussed. 
Keywords: Market power, Hungarian food chains. 
1. Introduction 
After the fall of socialist political and economic system, and entering the transition period, the 
restructuring process in the Hungarian dairy sector has begun. One of the most notable phenomena was an 
exceptional decrease in number of dairy farms. In the 1995-2007 periods, the number of dairy farms 
decreased to 59% leaving approximately 7,500 dairy farms in the sector. Secondly, there could be 
observed a continuous decrease in number of dairy cows in Hungary from almost 500 thousands in 1992 
to 323 thousands in 2007. Thirdly, the processing sector consolidated in the transition period with a 
decrease in number of dairy processor companies from roughly 170 in 1996 to 58 in 2007, leading to 
higher industry concentration ratios. In 2001 the CR5 index already amounted to roughly 60%., remaining 
around this level ever since.  
With regard to production level, raw milk in Hungary is predominantly produced by agricultural 
enterprises. In 2005 their share in number of dairy cows accounted for 67%, whereas family farms share 
was 33%, with a total production of roughly 1.8 billion litres (around 180 litres per capita). The average 
herd size in agricultural enterprises was 295 within the individual farms 6.2. As far as the FDIs are 
concerned, in the Hungarian dairy sector, foreign direct investments’ share in owners’ equity exceeded 80 
per cent already in 2000 (figure 1.). 
In the recent past agricultural economists pay great attention to the analysis of market structure and 
pricing on the market for raw milk in the CEER countries, including Hungary.  There are several papers 
focusing on the dairy market organisation and functioning in Hungary. Bakucs et al. (2009) discuss the 
effect of farm and processing industry structure upon the milk price transmission in Hungary and Poland. 
Szabó and Popovics (2008) discuss vertical transmission as well as coordination and integration 
mechanisms in the Hungarian dairy sector. Bakucs and Fertő (2008) assess the horizontal price 
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integration between three regions within Hungary. Finally, Hockmann and Vöneki (2008) analyse the 
possibility of tacit collusion in the Hungarian market for raw milk using a structural market model. 
Since 1980s, there have been numerous studies of New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) that 
pays special attention to measuring market power in agricultural and food markets. Most of these studies 
are based upon structural oligopoly or oligopsony models and find evidence of buyer or seller market 
power. Contrary to the majority of studies measuring the degree of market power, Muth and Wohlgenant 
(1999) failed to find any evidence of oligopsony power in the beef packing industry. Perekhozhuk et 
al. (2008) use a production function framework for the estimation of production technology and test of 
market power in the Ukrainian milk processing industry. However, using the regional level data, 
Perekhozhuk et al. (2009) found oligopsony power in four out of twenty two regions of Ukraine. 
Figure 1. Turnover, number of companies, industry concentration and FDI (share in owners equity) 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (AKI), 
Hungary. 
Here it is necessary to underline that all this studies rooted in the New Empirical Industrial Organization 
theory (NEIO), use the market level data to estimate a degree of market power at a national level, which 
are really limiting. As far as we know, only Wann and Sexton (1992), Weliwita and Azzam (1996), as 
well as Koontz and Garcia (1997), have estimated the degree of market power in a regional market level 
and found evidence of market power in the pear and meat packing industries, respectively.  
To our best knowledge, up to now there have been rather little of publication of empirical studies 
analyzing market power exertion at the firm-level. Only Morrison Paul (2001), using a plant-level data for 
the U.S. beef packing plants and found a presence of market power based on estimation of input demand 
equations derived from the Generalized-Leontief-Quadratic cost function. Moreover, she specifies the 
parameter of market power as a function of the number of cattle buyers, the expenditures of cattle 
procurement, the payment for overtime workers and the others variables. Using the binary dummy 
variable Hockmann and Vöneki (2009) to implicate the effects resulting from the ending of export 
subsidies at the beginning 2004 and estimated the parameter of oligopsony power over time. In contrast to 
the large and still rapidly expanding empirical studies the objective of this paper is to provide an analysis 
of market power at the firm level and to find firm specific effects that can be have influence on market 
structure and pricing in the Hungarian milk supply chain.  
Our paper is organized as follows: The next section presents the theoretical model of oligopsony power 
followed by description of firm-level data of the Hungarian milk processing plants in Section 3. The 
estimation results and specification tests are discussed in Section 4. The final section consists of the 
results and conclusions. 
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2. Econometric specification of the market structure model 
In contrast to Morrison Paul (2001) that Generalized-Leontief-Quadratic cost approach we use a 
production approach based on the transcendental logarithmic (translog) production function (Christensen, 
Jorgenson and Lau, 1973). Using the firm-level data for the Hungarian Milk Processing Industry we 
assume that the milk processing plants use only three factors, namely, raw milk ( )M , capital ( )C  and 
labor ( )L , thus the production function of the ith dairy plant can be written as:  
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where the variable T  is a proxy for technical change in the dairy industry. The use of panel data means 
that is possible to estimate the parameter of market power over time t , as well as, to compare market 
power across the ith dairy plant.  
The first-order condition for profit maximization with respect to raw milk that allows for imperfect 
competition on the raw milk market is determined as follows: 
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where MW  is the price of raw milk.  
Using the price elasticity of raw milk supply as exogenous constant point1 the parameter of oligopsony 
power Θ  can be tested econometrically based on the estimation of the production function (1) and the 
first order condition for profit maximization that allows for imperfect competition (2). For the 
econometric specification additive disturbance terms were added which were assumed to have zero mean, 
constant variance, and to be independently and normally distributed.  
A number of other aspects concerning the estimation and interpretation of the parameter of Θ  can be 
found in the empirical studies. Based on the plant-level data, Morrison Paul (2001) assumes that the 
parameter of market power is a function of the specific variable as the number of cattle buyers, the 
expenditures of cattle procurement, the payment for overtime workers and other variables. Hockmann and 
Vöneki (2009) used the binary dummy variable to implicate the effects resulting from the ending of 
export subsidies at the beginning 2004 and estimated the parameter of oligopsony power Θ  over time. 
Using the firm-level data for Hungarian dairy plants we will estimate the parameter of market power as 
constant parameter and used the dummy variables to specify the parameter of oligopsony power as 
function of variables for politic change (PC), Scale of Enterprise (SE) and the legal form of enterprise as 
the Private Enterprise (PrE), the Foreign Enterprise (FoE) and the Public Enterprise (PuE).  
3. Description of statistical data source 
In order to test for the existence of oligopsony power of the Hungarian milk processing industry, we use 
the firm level data obtained from the Institute of Economics Tarifa PM database. The data set includes 
432 firm-level observations of the Hungarian milk processing industry in the investigation period from 
1993 to 20062.  
A database contains individual data of enterprise net revenue ( )Y , material ( )M , capital ( )C  and labour 
( )L  input. The data for the farm price of raw milk ( )MW  and the retail price of milk ( )P  provided by the 
Institut of Economics of Hungarian Academy of Science. All variables in price and monetary terms were 
deflated by CPI.  
                                                          
1
 Similar assumptions may be found in works of Morrison Paul (2001), Schroeter (1988), Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990).  
2
 A detailed description of the data sources is available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 1. Description of statistics of the firm-level data  
Evidently from Table 2, the number of dairy enterprises ( )N  decreased from 35 to 21 between 1993 and 
2006. According to Hockmann and Vöneki (2009) the number of milk processor in Hungarian milk 
processing industry was reduced from 104 to 93 between 1997 and 2004. That means that we do not have 
all the firm data. However, based on a calculation of concentration of Hungarian milk processing we have 
estimated approximately the same results at least for concentration ratio (CR1) by the largest dairy 
enterprises as indicated by Hockmann and Vöneki (2009). 
Table 2. The Concentration Ratio (CR) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
Using the net revenue of dairy enterprises we calculated the four-firm and ten-firm concentration ratio 
(CR) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for Hungarian dairy industry. Between 1993 and 2006, 
the market share of the four largest dairy enterprises in the industry (the four-firm concentration ratio) has 
double from approximately 33.6% to more than 65.6%. In 2006, the ten-firm concentration ratio ( )10CR  
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Y  Production output (net revenue, Mio. HUF) 1466.7 1981.7 3.717 
12234.70
0 
M  Material input (material cost, Mio. HUF) 1258.7 1713.5 1.859 11024.200 
C  Capital input (tangible assets, Mio. HUF) 232.6 320.6 0.536 1778.380 
L  Labour input (number of employees) 298.7 333.4 10 1874 
T  Time ( )2006,..,1993=T  1998.6 3.8 1993 2006 
MW  Farm price of raw milk (100 HUF pro kg)  18.3 1.7 13.993 20.447 
P  Retail price of milk (100 HUF) 35.1 2.7 31.521 41.001 
Source: Own calculation based on the firm data provided by the Institut of Economics of Hungarian 
Academy of Science. 
Year N  1CR  4CR  10CR  HHI*1000 1/n*1000 
1993 35 10.65 33.67 66.47 54.99 28.57 
1994 36 11.35 34.01 66.07 54.65 27.78 
1995 40 9.95 31.26 63.06 49.66 25.00 
1996 40 9.99 33.71 63.26 50.71 25.00 
1997 36 11.53 38.18 66.23 57.54 27.78 
1998 40 13.10 38.50 70.00 61.61 25.00 
1999 35 21.76 51.69 82.75 96.51 28.57 
2000 35 23.00 56.89 84.63 107.94 28.57 
2001 32 20.02 55.92 83.78 104.86 31.25 
2002 24 21.43 61.30 90.11 124.17 41.67 
2003 19 31.60 70.77 92.63 167.05 52.63 
2004 19 27.28 68.50 92.63 145.14 52.63 
2005 20 24.32 65.59 90.65 130.61 50.00 
2006 21 36.16 65.64 87.52 172.14 47.62 
Source: Own calculations based on the firm data provided by Institut of Economics of Hungarian 
Academy of Science.  
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makes up almost 90% of total output of dairy industry. Between 1993 and 2006, the market share of the 
largest dairy enterprise increased from 10.7% to 36.1%, thus three times as many. These results indicate a 
high degree of concentration in the Hungarian dairy industry. 
Compared to the milk processing industry in Germany or the United States, the Hungarian dairy industry 
is relatively highly concentrated. In 2004, the market share of the six and ten largest dairy enterprises in 
milk processing industry in Germany was 25.2% and 37.4%. In 2002, the four and eight firm 
concentration ratio in the USA was 29.6% and 42.5% respectively.  
4. Estimation results and specification testing 
The model is based on the estimation of the translog production function (1) and the first-order condition 
for profit maximization (2). Hence, the price of raw milk ( )MW  and the output of milk processing 
industry ( )Y  are endogenous. Since equation (2) is intrinsically nonlinear in its parameters, the market 
structure model represents a nonlinear simultaneous equation system. Therefore, the model was estimated 
using nonlinear three-stage least squares (cf. Amemiya, 1977). All the exogenous variables in the system 
were used as instruments. Estimation was carried out using the statistical software STATA. For the 
estimation of the market structure model we use the price elasticity of raw milk supply ( )1.0=ε  that was 
previously estimated in the other empirical studies, for example, by Suzuki et al. (1993), Lopez et al. 
(1994), Perekhozhuk (2007). Tables 3 preset the estimation result of the four estimated models. 
Table 3. Estimated parameters of NLS estimation 
Parameter 
Model 1: Competition Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Coef. Std. Err. z-Ratio Coef. 
Std. 
Err. z-Ratio Coef. 
Std. 
Err. z-Ratio Coef. 
Std. 
Err. z-Ratio 
0α  -0.0651 0.0093 -6.99 -0.0602 0.0092 -6.56 -0.0617 0.0085 -7.22 -0.0616 0.0085 -7.28 
Mα  0.9738 0.0059 166.08 0.9359 0.0103 90.55 0.9553 0.0102 93.65 0.9519 0.0097 98.02 
Cα  0.0197 0.0079 2.48 0.0262 0.0079 3.31 0.0131 0.0075 1.74 0.0124 0.0074 1.67 
Lα  0.0231 0.0122 1.90 0.0600 0.0146 4.11 0.0447 0.0138 3.24 0.0488 0.0135 3.61 
Tα  -0.0031 0.0016 -2.01 -0.0028 0.0015 -1.84 -0.0021 0.0014 -1.46 -0.0020 0.0014 -1.42 
MMα  0.1523 0.0054 28.00 0.1460 0.0054 27.21 0.1461 0.0050 29.36 0.1484 0.0049 30.08 
CCα  0.0203 0.0086 2.36 0.0240 0.0084 2.85 0.0126 0.0079 1.59 0.0084 0.0079 1.06 
LLα  0.0358 0.0227 1.58 0.0517 0.0223 2.31 0.0343 0.0218 1.58 0.0505 0.0207 2.44 
TTα  0.0036 0.0008 4.50 0.0031 0.0008 3.93 0.0038 0.0007 5.20 0.0038 0.0007 5.26 
MCα  -0.0478 0.0060 -8.00 -0.0431 0.0058 -7.40 -0.0271 0.0057 -4.78 -0.0219 0.0058 -3.76 
MLα  -0.1197 0.0099 -12.10 -0.1242 0.0096 -13.00 -0.1204 0.0094 -12.80 -0.1319 0.0090 -14.65 
MTα  -0.0157 0.0015 -10.68 -0.0158 0.0014 -11.31 0.0028 0.0024 1.17 0.0027 0.0024 1.15 
CLα  0.0678 0.0109 6.22 0.0601 0.0108 5.56 0.0499 0.0102 4.90 0.0498 0.0100 4.98 
CTα  -0.0006 0.0020 -0.29 -0.0003 0.0019 -0.14 -0.0035 0.0018 -1.89 -0.0032 0.0018 -1.80 
LTα  0.0189 0.0029 6.47 0.0199 0.0028 6.98 0.0006 0.0033 0.18 0.0006 0.0033 0.19 
CΘ  - - - -0.0055 0.0012 -4.44 -0.0722 0.0118 -6.12 -0.0961 0.0392 -2.45 
TΘ  - - - - - - 0.0144 0.0031 4.66 0.0136 0.0032 4.30 
PCΘ  - - - - - - 0.2749 0.0348 7.91 0.2822 0.0347 8.12 
SEΘ  - - - - - - 0.0048 0.0019 2.52 - - - 
EPrΘ  - - - - - - - - - 0.0123 0.0390 0.31 
FoEΘ  - - - - - - - - - 0.0859 0.0418 2.05 
PuEΘ  - - - - - - - - - 0.0037 0.0040 0.92 
Source: Own estimation based on the firm-level data provided by the Institut of Economics of 
Hungarian Academy of Science. 
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In the first model the parameter Θ  was restricted to zero (Model 1). In this case, the market structure 
model represents competitive market conditions. In the second model, the parameter CΘ  was estimated 
as a constant parameter (Model 2). In the Model 3 we use dummy variables to capture various effects 
from the policy change (PC) over time ( )T  and the scale of enterprise (SE). In comparison to the third 
model, instead of the effects of scale of enterprise, the Model 4 presents effects of legal form of enterprise 
as the Private Enterprise (PrE), the Foreign Enterprise (FoE) and the Public Enterprise (PuE). 
The asymptotic z-ratio indicates that most parameters are significant at least at 5 % level. For the purpose 
of simplification of interpretation of estimated parameter values, all model variables were transformed 
into deviations from their geometric mean. Therefore of the estimated parameter of the translog function, 
namely, Mα , Cα  and Lα  indicate a production elasticity of raw milk, capital and labour input, 
respectively. Moreover the parameter Tγ  is the rate of technical change in the milk processing plants over 
time. The production elasticity of raw milk was estimated to be between 0.97 (Model 1) and 0.95 
(Model 4). The estimated production elasticity of capital and labour is very robust and changes itself 
starting with the second decimal point. However, not all estimated parameters of capital and labour 
elasticities are statistically significant. In addition, we test the hypothesis of constant returns to scale 
based on test linear hypotheses for the parameters of production function, such LCMj
j j
,,,1 ==∑α . The 
hypothesis of constant returns to scale could be rejected even at the 1% level. Thus, we estimated the 
increasing returns to scale in the Hungarian milk processing industry. The scale elasticity is very similar 
and approximately amounts from 1.02 for first and second models to 1.01 for the third and fours model in 
all estimated models, respectively. Finally, the estimated rate of technical change ( )Tγ  is negative, but 
not statistically significant at least at the 10 % level of statistical significance.  
Here, the estimated parameters of the first-order condition for profit maximization measuring the degree 
of oligopsony power of milk processing plants is of great interest to us. The results of model 1 indicate 
that the parameter of oligopsony power estimated as constant is close to zero. 
However, in Model 3 and 4 we use a dummy variable to account for policy change and other firm specific 
effects. The Model 3 present results for the effects of policy change (PC), over time (T), as well as, of the 
scale of enterprise (SE). The asymptotic z-ratio indicates that all this effect is significant at least at the 
1 % level of statistical significance. In additional Model 4 also has other firm specific effect such as legal 
form of enterprise. While, the parameter EPrΘ (Private Enterprise) and PuEΘ (Public Enterprise) is not 
statistically significant, the parameter FoEΘ (Foreign Enterprise) is statistically significant at least at 5 % 
level. In addition, we test the null hypothesis pertaining to the parameter CΘ  (Model 2), to the subset 
SEPCTC Θ+Θ+Θ+Θ  (Model 3) and to the following subset of firm specific effects 
PuEFoEEPCTC Θ+Θ+Θ+Θ+Θ+Θ Pr  (Model 4).  
Table 4. Wald test and estimates of the parameter of market power 
As the test results indicate, the null hypothesis could be rejected even at the 1% significance level in all 
models. Moreover, on the basis of the test of market power there is an extensive evidence of the existence 
of oligopsony market power of Hungarian milk processing enterprises. Our estimation results confirm the 
findings of previous studies by Hockmann and Vöneki (2009). The test results of Model 3 and 4 indicate 
that the parameter oligopsony market power is 0.22 and 0.30 in the evaluation period from 1993 to 2006, 
respectively. The asymptotic z-ratio indicates that estimated results are significant even at 1 % level. This 
empirical result is consistent with a relatively highly concentration in the Hungarian milk processing 
industry. In the course of the last seven years, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for Hungarian dairy 
Model Oligopsony power and impacts of effects 0
H -Test  Test of market power 
2χ  p-value Coef. Std. Err. z-Ratio 
Model 2 CΘ  19.75 0.0000 -0.0055 0.0012 -4.40 
Model 3 SEPCTC Θ+Θ+Θ+Θ  39.81 0.0000 0.2219 0.0352 6.30 
Model 4 PuEFoEEPCTC Θ+Θ+Θ+Θ+Θ+Θ Pr  25.43 0.0000 0.3015 .0598 5.04 
Source: Own estimation based on the firm-level data provided by Institut of Economics of Hungarian 
Academy of Science. 
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industry has immensely increased and lies between 0.1 and 0.2. Moreover, based on the obtained firm-
level data, the econometric results confirm the test characteristics of effects reported by Hockmann and 
Vöneki (2009), who have used monthly time series data from January 1998 to October 2006 at the 
national level.   
For a general comparison of the estimated models Table 5 lists some coefficients of statistical inference.  
The fit of the estimated models is quite good. 
Table 5. Statistical inference of NLS estimation 
The lowest and largest R-square between observed and predicted values obtained for the equations of the 
production function are very similar and amount from 0.9944 in the competition model (Model 1) to 
0.9952 for the Model 3 and 4, respectively. The lowest and the largest R-square values for the first-order 
condition are 0.9783 in the Model 1 (competition model) and 0.9822 in the model 4. Thus, statistical 
results show a slightly better performance of the Model 4.  
5. Summary and conclusions 
The objective of this paper was to measure the degree of oligopsony power in the Hungarian milk 
processing industry. For this purpose, four econometric models were estimated. In this study, the 
production technology in Hungarian milk processing industry is represented by a translog production 
function, which imposes much less a priori restrictions on the technology than neoclassical functions. The 
estimated production elasticities of capital and labour are positively, but not highly statistically 
significant. The hypothesis of constant returns to scale is rejected. The econometric results show 
increasing returns to scale in the Hungarian milk processing industry. 
Using the firm-level data, we estimated the parameter of oligopsony market power in the Hungarian Milk 
Processing Industry. The null hypothesis test for perfect competition in Hungarian milk processing 
industry is rejected. Furthermore, the various effects have to be considered. The statistical results show 
that the effects from the policy change over time, the firm specific effects from the scale of enterprise, the 
legal form of enterprise as the Private Enterprise, the Foreign Enterprise and the Public Enterprise are 
statistically significant and produce evidence suggesting the exercise of market power by the Hungarian 
milk processing plats. The statistical results show that all these effects are statistically significant and 
indicate that the estimated parameter oligopsony market power is 0.22 and 0.30 in the estimated period 
since 1993 until 2006, respectively. This econometric result is consistent with a relatively highly 
concentration in the Hungarian milk processing industry and confirm the findings of earlier analysis of 
collusion in the Hungarian market for raw milk. 
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